tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8296287100970811608.post926621291864396786..comments2024-03-06T06:52:36.635-05:00Comments on The 48th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry: The Fog of War?John David Hoptakhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10521690201528852944noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8296287100970811608.post-54109293665646474282007-10-09T16:19:00.000-04:002007-10-09T16:19:00.000-04:00John,I really enjoyed this post as you effciently ...John,<BR/><BR/>I really enjoyed this post as you effciently link a series of foggy mornings today to very real consequences that weather brought to Antietam in '62. <BR/><BR/>I also found myself thinking (perhaps for the first time) that General Halleck deserves substantial credit in ordering Col Miles not to simply evacuate Harpers Ferry as Lee advanced north of his position to Hagerstown - but to wait until relieved by Little Mac. It is easy to focus on McClellan's tentativeness after finding Order 191 and his culpability in not attacking after he came up on the 15th, but your post really got me thinking critically about Halleck's actions in manipulating Lee, forcing the splitting of his army, leading directly to the defeat at South Mountain and the abandonment of the Maryland Campaign. One could argue that the victory on South Mountain is more attributable to Halleck than McClellan. That is certainly not a point I have explicitly considered before. I wonder if there is any retrospective in any of Halleck's writings on this?<BR/><BR/>Thanks for a great, thought-provoking post.<BR/><BR/>Cory NewbyCory Newbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18378367187050575834noreply@blogger.com